Introduction
'Ethics on the laboratory floor' is, at the same time, the triumph and reductio ad absurdum of constructivist accounts of scientific practice with their implied decisionism, if not voluntarism. It is the triumph of constructivism, as its insights are no longer thought to undermine science and its quest for reality or truth. Having exposed the myth that science follows for the most part, a collectively binding logic of research as envisaged by Karl Popper, as well as Thomas Kuhn, we now fully appreciate that scientists make choices. And these choices may carry the signature of prejudice or ideology, private interest or aesthetic preference, ethics or politics. The 'science wars' that revolved around the apparent abandonment of an image of science that speaks truth to power (Sokal 1996) have given way to a 'love fest' that celebrates the openness of science, for example to ethical consideration (cf. Nordmann 2007; Nowotny et al. 2003) . But here, the proximity of triumph and reductio ad absurdum comes in. On the one hand, we celebrate the possibility of 'midstream modulation' of scientific practice where social scientists and philosophers induce reflectiveness about the relative environmental merits of using this material or that in a laboratory experiment (Fisher and Mahajan 2006) . On the other hand, we thereby perform a vanishing trick which is very welcome to science policymakers: by fostering the illusion that our scientific and technological future is an aggregate of decisions on the laboratory floor, one arrives 213 at a policy landscape where responsible innovation means as much as making sure that researchers are prudent and that citizens are well prepared for what it is to come in the future. In the meantime, and in the middle between these remote poles, there are no hard choices to be made about the directions of research, about funding priorities. On this account, the difficult choices take place where ordinary political debate does not reach, namely among experts on the laboratory floor or in the future when people will be confronted with new technologies. As for the here and now, public debate about emerging technologies is generally welcome, but need not address itself to any concrete policy choices. Accordingly, the role of policy is merely to create an environment that is generally conducive to innovation, that cultivates ethical sensitivities in the laboratory, and that fosters public preparedness for emerging technologies.
This is a caricature, to be sure, of current discourse about scientific and technological development. But it is telling enough that such a caricature can appear plausible (Davies et al. 2009; Nordmann and Schwarz 2010) . And this is even more striking as one can so easily expose the proximity of triumph and absurdity in the fixation on decision-making within the day-to-day running of the laboratory (Winner 1993): as important an insight as it was that the decisions of researchers are underdetermined by logic and evidence, and thus open to societal considerations, it is, nevertheless, an untenable suggestion that these choices are of considerable consequence for technological development. The choice of material or method can be very important, no doubt, but doesn't quite measure up to the decision as to whether or not mortality from cancer should have higher research priority than chronic pain, or the question of balancing biofuels against agricultural crops, or the choice of mitigation and adaptation strategies in response to global warming. It is at the latter scale that the 'real decisions' about scientific and technological development are made, and this scale is incommensurate to that of the laboratory floor, if only because decisions about the direction of research set the frame in which research trajectories unfold, while decisions on the laboratory floor exploit the remaining degrees of freedom within the framework.
What follows from this critique of contemporary science policy discourse and its focus on scientific conduct? (cf. EC Code of Conduct 2008) One should not conclude, of course, that there is no place for 'ethics on the laboratory floor'. Reflexivity is rightly considered a virtue in almost any situation. Though it would be detrimental for public debate to abdicate its role in setting a research agenda, it is, nevertheless,
